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Temporary Agency Work in Europe 
François Michon 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifi que
European countries have been experiencing the growth of employ-
ment in nonstandard or fl exible work arrangements. The basic causal 
factors have been similar to those experienced in the United States and 
Japan: global economic forces have required employers to adapt and 
change more quickly. In response to these economic forces, temporary 
agency work (TAW), one of a variety of fl exible employment arrange-
ments, has expanded over the past 30 years.1 Although it existed earlier 
in some European countries, in others TAW has been authorized for 
only a few years. In some countries TAW is still restricted to a limited 
number of professions. 
A variety of approaches exist to regulate and monitor temporary 
work agencies (TWAs) and the services they provide. These variations 
refl ect distinctive national approaches to the regulation of labor mar-
kets and their institutions. Because of the diversity of these approaches, 
TAW is one area where the efforts for harmonization of national labor 
markets within the European Union (EU) have failed in the last few 
years. As a result, no common standard for the regulation of TAW has 
been developed in the EU. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of TAW with-
in the EU and explain the challenges confronted as the EU continues 
its efforts to harmonize policies regulating TAW across its member na-
tions. The regulations of EU members and the social debates on TAW 
are reviewed. Much of the discussion is based on data collected in a 
1999 survey of the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) 
(2000). A 2002 study of the Dublin European Foundation, which fo-
cused on the economic analysis of TAW in EU members, and a 2005 
study of the European Industrial Relations Observatory, which actual-
ized the 1999 survey in the context of the EU enlargement, were used 
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to provide updates on some major changes in national regulations that 
occurred after 1999 (Storrie 2002; Arrowsmith 2006).
The chapter fi rst provides an overview of the growth of fl exible 
work in Europe, including a brief discussion of the problems associated 
with trying to estimate the prevalence of TAW. Variations in the nation-
al defi nitions and regulations of TAW are then reviewed. The perspec-
tives on TAW of employers’ organizations and unions are presented, 
followed by a discussion of the differences in national approaches to the 
regulation of TAW through the use of laws and collective bargaining. 
The rules which the fi rms that use TAW must follow in each country to 
secure the social protection of employees also are described. Through-
out this discussion the extreme heterogeneity of the regulatory frame-
works of the EU nations is emphasized. Finally, concluding comments 
on the very brief history of “Social Europe” and the future of its labor 
market institutions are provided. Several future directions for research 
are identifi ed. 
FLEXIBLE WORK AND TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK 
IN EUROPE
The need for greater labor market fl exibility has been discussed for 
almost 20 years in Europe. When compared to the United States, labor 
market fl exibility in European countries often is viewed as inadequate 
except in a few countries such as the United Kingdom. Labor market 
rigidities such as those created by government regulations encouraging 
standard employment arrangements are often discussed as the main rea-
son for the slower economic growth and the high levels of unemploy-
ment in Europe. These discussions of the limited labor market fl exibility 
in the EU focus primarily on adjustments of the number of employees. 
One of several forms of atypical employment that permit numerical 
adjustments to be made easily by employers is temporary agency work. 
However, due to poor data, it is diffi cult to accurately measure the ac-
tual prevalence of TAW in the EU as discussed in more detail below.
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EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AND FLEXIBLE LABOR 
MARKETS IN EUROPE
Since the beginning of the 1990s the rate of economic growth in 
Europe has been lower than that of the United States. The key trends 
in Europe during the 1990s were an increase in the importance of both 
unemployment and atypical work.2 These trends resulted in greater at-
tention to how labor market fl exibility is linked to the regulation of 
employment contracts such as TAW.
For a short period of time in the late 1990s it appeared that the rate 
of increase in unemployment had slowed due to the positive response 
of standard employment to the economic recovery and the creation of 
jobs. The strong job creation that occurred during the late nineties (Eu-
ropean Commission 2002) appeared to have been linked 
. . . to jobs of better quality . . . Recovery is now favoring more 
stable employment. The proportion of workers on fi xed-term con-
tracts (temporary work) in all new jobs created was only slightly 
over a third in 1999, compared with 50 percent in previous years. 
. . . For the fi rst time since 1990, full-time jobs created—some 63 
percent in 1999—exceeded the number of part-time jobs created. 
(European Commission 2000) 
However, the economic climate began to deteriorate in 2001 and 
worsened in the following year due to the uncertainty of the interna-
tional political situation. Since then the EU has had great diffi culty re-
covering a fast and solid economic growth, especially in the old core 
of its member nations: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Neth-
erlands. In these countries, the downturn had a signifi cant negative im-
pact on job creation for both standard and atypical employment.
Since the late 1990s the EU has tried to promote a European em-
ployment strategy (the so-called Lisbon strategy) which focuses on an 
increase in employment rates and in the quality of jobs. However, as the 
European Commission (2005) stated, 
[t]he weak labour market performance in Europe over recent years 
is an important element in explaining the slow progress towards 
the Lisbon and Stockholm objectives. The overall employment 
rate remains 7 percentage points below the employment rate target 
for 2010.
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The evidence of limits, or even failures, of the Lisbon strategy has 
been presented in many reports, comments, and proposals to increase 
the effi ciency of this strategy (see, for example, Kok [2004]). The main 
point repeated in these commentaries is that welfare and social justice 
remain largely a member country issue. Furthermore, many members 
are opposed to removing any national regulations in favor of the EU 
institutions. Consequently, in the present environment, the European in-
stitutions can only propose objectives, observe the situation of country 
members relative to these objectives, and give their opinions. 
Labor market fl exibility, or the lack thereof, is often explained 
in the context of the regulations defi ning—and thus potentially con-
straining—employment contracts, with particular attention given to the 
amount of fl exibility gained from atypical employment arrangements. 
It therefore is commonly associated with fi xed-term contracts and TAW, 
and in some EU members (especially in France, Spain, and Italy) with 
part-time contracts. However, within Europe part-time employment and 
fi xed-term contracts are better known than TAW because there are more 
of them. Part-time contracts are different from the standard full-time 
contracts because they imply in most of European countries a specifi c 
employment status. Part-time employees are not necessarily easier to 
fi re, but it is easier to increase or decrease their daily, weekly, or even 
monthly work times. The increase in part-time employment and fi xed-
term contracts from 1990 through 2004 is shown for 10 EU countries 
in Figures 9.1 and 9.2, respectively. For these two types of employment 
arrangements the European Labor Force Surveys provide good quanti-
tative data for intra-European comparisons.
The use of these employment arrangements varies by country. Fig-
ure 9.1 indicates that in 2004 in the Netherlands, part-time employment 
was over 45 percent of total employment but just under 10 percent in 
Belgium and Spain. The other seven nations range from about 15 per-
cent to 45 percent. Fixed-term contracts in Figure 9.2 show a different 
pattern of prevalence. In 2004 in Spain fi xed-term contracts represent 
over 30 percent of total employment, but the other nine countries are in 
the range of 5 percent to 15 percent.
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Figure 9.1  Part-Time Employment in Selected EU Countries (% Total Employment)
SOURCE: Eurostat.
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Figure 9.2  Fixed-Term Contracts in Selected EU Countries (% Total Employment) 
SOURCE: Eurostat.
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Prevalence of Temporary Agency Work
TAW was one of the most rapidly growing forms of atypical em-
ployment in the 1990s (Storrie 2002). However, this growth is diffi cult 
to measure and compare across the EU nations. Unlike the measures of 
the prevalence of part-time employment and fi xed-term contracts, there 
are no equivalent employment data for TWA. Due to the differences in 
national regulations, the terms temporary agency work or temporary 
work agency refer to very different and noncomparable employment 
arrangements between the three partners in the relationship: the em-
ployee, the TWA, and the client fi rm. This explains why the available 
data that compare TAW cross-nationally within the EU nations are un-
reliable, and there are no data at all for some countries. Due to the lack 
of common defi nitions, the Statistical Offi ce of the European Commu-
nities (Eurostat) does not try to quantitatively measure the prevalence 
of TAW.3 It therefore is diffi cult to provide a precise and comprehensive 
picture of the prevalence of TAW in Europe, and estimates of the rate 
of growth of TWA are even more diffi cult.4 Consequently, the estimates 
provided below of the prevalence of TAW must be used with caution. 
In an effort to provide some data, the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions undertook a study of 
TAW.5 The resulting estimates range widely from no TAW in Greece to 4 
percent of total employment in the Netherlands, as shown in Table 9.1.
For the 13 nations that reported the use of TAW by sector in the 
1999 EIRO survey, 6 reported that TAW was concentrated in the in-
dustrial sector, and 7, the tertiary sector (services, public services, and 
retail). The industrial TAW was dominant in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain; the tertiary TAW was dominant in Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United King-
dom. The industrial sector consisted primarily of manual labor and a 
male workforce, while the tertiary sector was primarily a female and 
white-collar workforce. According to the European Trade Union Con-
federation (2005),
. . . in the UK, some 80 percent of temporary agency work is in 
the service and public sectors, while three-quarters is in construc-
tion and manufacturing industry in France. In most of the EU-15, 
the majority of workers are male, but in all three Nordic countries 
there are more women, and proportions are roughly equal in the 
Netherlands and the UK.
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A second estimate of the prevalence of TAW was developed by the 
French employer organization for TWA, Syndicat des Entreprises de 
Travail Temporaire (SETT). This organization published estimates for 
2004 derived from national sources for only eight EU countries. A com-
parison of Tables 9.1 and 9.2 suggests a relatively large increase from 
1999 to 2004 in TAW in the United Kingdom, but no clear trend in the 
other countries. 
Both tables refl ect national historical differences in the treatment 
and regulation of TAW in the context of all forms of temporary work. 
Actual changes suggest that there are two reasons why limitations im-
posed by regulation based on the types of jobs and industrial sector are 
being reduced. First, there has been an increased acceptance over time 
of TAW in countries that for a long time were reluctant to expand TAW. 
This will result in a relaxation of these regulations. Second, temporary 
work agencies are developing their businesses to provide their services 
wherever temporary help is needed, and even when temporary help for 




















United Kingdom 557,000 2.1
EU total 2,080,642 1.4
SOURCE: EIRO (2000).
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long periods of time is required (European Trade Union Confederation 
2005). Regulations are likely to be relaxed as employers become more 
dependent on these services.
Finally, what Tables 9.1 and 9.2 do not show is the importance of 
TAW in labor fl ows into and out of unemployment, and out of and into 
employment. The 1999 EIRO report provided this information for a few 
countries. For example, TAW in Spain accounts for 12.5 percent of new 
employment contracts. This is not surprising since temporary work ar-
rangements of various types are often entry-level jobs for persons enter-
ing the labor force and for those with relatively low levels of skills. 
DEFINING TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK AND 
TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES
In an effort to standardize the social protections provided to em-
ployees hired through atypical employment contracts, the EU author-
ities in the second half of the 1990s organized negotiations between 
the EU-level social partners (employers and unions) on “fl exibility in 
working time and security for workers.”6 The European negotiations 
focused on three types of atypical employment: part-time work, fi xed-
term contracts, and TAW. It was expected that some European standard-















SOURCE: Syndicat des Entreprises de Travail Temporaire (2005).
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ization of the defi nitions and regulations in all three areas would result. 
EU-level negotiations were concluded successfully on part-time work 
in 1997 and on fi xed-term contract work in 1999. They produced two 
offi cial directives from the European authorities. The negotiations on 
TAW were the last to be organized, but in May 2001 they failed despite 
repeated efforts to resolve differences. 
The EU-level collective negotiations on TAW failed because the 
social partners were unable to negotiate an acceptable compromise. 
Unions blamed employers for the failure. They perceived employers 
as trying to completely deregulate TAW. However, the employer repre-
sentatives were divided among themselves along two lines: there was 
confl ict between the interests of the client fi rms and temporary work 
agencies, and the objectives of employers varied from one country to 
another. The only result of the negotiations was a common “declara-
tion” that mainly stressed the general principle of equal treatment be-
tween temporary agency workers and permanent employees.
Even this declaration was ambiguous on some points and was hard-
ly discussed by the national members of the employers’ organization. 
It did not clarify what aspects of permanent employment should be the 
reference points for equal treatment, nor whether the permanent em-
ployment was in the TWA or the client fi rm. Making such determina-
tions was not an easy task in the European context. Some countries 
legally restrict the role of a TWA to offering temporary workers who are 
temporary employees of the TWA to client fi rms, while in other coun-
tries a TWA can in addition select, train, and hire permanent employees 
for their future employers. Consequently, the TWAs under these two 
different regulations are not the same businesses.
Further EU Actions to Standardize TAW Regulations
After the failure of the TWA negotiations, the European authori-
ties decided to seek an agreement between EU member governments 
instead of employers and unions. The basis for this step was the prior 
declaration by the EU social partners of the principle of equality of 
treatment of temporary agency workers and permanent employees. In 
March 2002 the European Commission issued a “draft directive” on 
temporary work. It was studied and extensively amended by the Euro-
pean Parliament in November 2002. Although the general principle of 
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equal treatment was accepted, there was much discussion of the defi ni-
tions of the comparable workers and the acceptance of the possibility of 
EU members being exempted or allowed to deviate from the principle 
(European Industrial Relations Observatory 2002). 
The formal objective of the directive proposed in November 2002 
by the Commission of European Communities is to ensure better work-
ing conditions for temporary workers. This directive defi nes TWA and 
TAW and the workers that will be covered. The Employment, Social 
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council examined the directive in 
March and June 2003, but an agreement was not reached (European In-
dustrial Relations Observatory 2003). According to the European Trade 
Union Confederation (2005), adoption of such an “essential piece of 
social legislation” is blocked by a minority of EU member states, name-
ly: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Since then, 
nothing more has been done. 
Differences in National Defi nitions of TAW
The major diffi culty confronted in the EU discussions is that the 
national laws are very dissimilar and do not provide even a minimum 
basis for a common perspective on which an EU-level agreement can 
be developed. On TAW issues the situation is characterized by such 
signifi cant heterogeneity between countries that regulations do not even 
use the same vocabulary. Recent changes in national regulations do not 
modify this general picture. There is no agreement on what is called 
“temporary agency work” and how is it specifi ed relative to other forms 
of temporary work or even to standard employment contracts. Further-
more, there is no agreement on what is called a “temporary work agen-
cy” or how is it specifi ed relative to other forms of services provided 
to fi rms or to the other forms of three-way relationships between an 
employee, an employer who has signed an employment contract with 
an employee, and another employer for whom the employee is working 
(e.g., service subcontracts or some workforce lending or leasing). Due 
to this lack of a common approach, the EU authorities’ proposals have 
been written in relatively vague language to avoid confl icts with the 
specifi c regulations of the member nations.
In some countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
TAW is fully recognized as a specifi c employment relationship. In oth-
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ers, the defi nitions and regulations are vague, and there are no clearly 
defi ned categories. Consequently, the available information on atypical 
employment and TAW is extremely diverse and of variable quality. The 
public debate at both the national and European levels over appropri-
ate regulatory and collective bargaining approaches to TAW refl ects the 
lack of accurate, high-quality data and standardized defi nitions of the 
activities being measured. 
The 1999 EIRO survey indicated that there are three approaches to 
the defi nition of TAW in Europe: 1) TAW is not clearly distinguished 
from other forms of fl exible work and therefore can be measured poorly 
at best; 2) TAW is determined solely by identifying the companies given 
the status known as a TWA; the temporary employment businesses thus 
are formally recognized, but their temporary employees are not; and 3) 
a defi ned legal status is given to both the temporary employment agen-
cies and to the employees working for them, so TWA employment can 
be relatively easily measured.7 These approaches are discussed below 
for the countries using each approach.
No Distinction between TAW and Other Flexible Work
Temporary agency work is not clearly distinguished from other 
forms of fl exible work in a few countries such as Finland, Ireland, and 
the United Kingdom. The lack of reliable quantitative data on TWA in 
these countries makes it diffi cult to determine whether this situation 
refl ects a very small amount of this type of work in these countries or 
the lack of a precise defi nition that distinguishes TAW from other forms 
of employment, particularly other forms of temporary work. This data 
measurement problem can be illustrated by using the United Kingdom 
as an example. According to Morris (2002), the British Department 
of Trade and Industry reported 600,000 temporary agency workers in 
2002 in the United Kingdom, contrasting markedly with two other re-
ports. In spring 2002 the British Labour Force Survey reported 275,000 
workers (Offi ce for National Statistics 2002), while the Recruitment 
and Employment Confederation (REC) reported 1,336,699 workers 
(REC 2002).
There is no precise defi nition of TAW in any of the three countries. 
In Finland the contract binding a temporary employment agency to its 
employees is almost identical to the contract required by regulations 
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for temporary work. Irish regulations hardly intervene in the relation-
ship between temporary work agency and the worker since the Irish 
worker has been considered an employee of the client company for a 
long time. 
In the United Kingdom no unique status is granted to TAW. It de-
pends on the same regulations as any temporary work regardless of 
whether workers are employed directly by the client fi rm or by the em-
ployment agency, or even are independent. This treatment of TAW re-
fl ects two factors. First, it is frequently the same company that acts both 
as an employment agency and as a temporary employment agency as the 
term is used in this chapter. No statutory regulation now distinguishes 
one activity from the other. As for the formal employment relationship 
itself, the courts must determine the employer to whom the employee 
is contractually bound: the employment agency or the client company. 
Second, temporary workers increasingly can be self-employed. This 
means that the agency is only a structure that manages administrative 
procedures associated with the employment of the temporary workers.
However, in the beginning of the 1990s the situation of TAW 
changed in these countries. For example, in 1994 Finland abolished the 
existing regulations on hiring, which distinguished between permanent 
and temporary employees. To provide some protection for workers, the 
responsibilities of a temporary employment agency and its client com-
pany were clarifi ed instead. In 1993 Ireland acknowledged that tempo-
rary contracts could be renewed repeatedly, but left it to the courts in 
case of confl ict to determine whether employer abuses were being per-
petrated. Furthermore, the principle was established that a temporary 
agency worker was not employed by the client company. In 1994 the 
United Kingdom abolished the necessity of TWAs receiving a permit 
to do business, and later contemplated new regulations to acknowledge 
that an employment relationship exists between the employee and the 
“employment agency.” The Employment Relations Act of 1999 re-
moved the prohibition against regulations which restricted employment 
agencies from paying temporary workers directly.
Defi ning Only Temporary Work Agencies
In some countries the presence of TAW is determined by a company 
status known as the “temporary work agency.” The prevalence of TAW 
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is determined solely by identifying the companies given this status. 
These temporary employment businesses are formally recognized, but 
their temporary employees are not. This pattern is quite frequent. 
The TWA “status” is conferred by very different regulations in these 
countries, however, and usually is determined in one of two ways. The 
fi rst is to issue a permit for the TWA. A company given the status of a 
TWA then becomes the basis for specifying the temporary nature of the 
employment relationship between the agency and the employees the 
agency sends for assignment to the client fi rms. The second gives a per-
manent contract to all employees of a TWA who are sent to an assign-
ment. This permanent contract can be a specifi c one, or a standard one 
used for ordinary open-ended contracts. In this situation it is no longer 
the employment contract that separates TAW and other forms of em-
ployment but only the status of the employer. The principle of authoriz-
ing TWAs as employment agencies now seems established. However, 
the principle of a specifi c open-ended contract, or even a standard open-
ended contract, being used for temporary agency employees seems to 
be losing ground, and is now less frequently used than before. 
The different national approaches are illustrated by fi ve countries: 
Spain, Germany, Norway, Austria, and the Netherlands. For example, 
in Spain TWAs have been legally recognized since 1994 and must be 
licensed by the state. The employee’s contract can be either permanent 
or temporary.
Private TWAs in Germany are subject to the approval of the Fed-
eral Employment Department. Until 1997 TWAs were bound to their 
employees by a permanent contract, basically similar to any standard 
employment contract but the periods of work were for a strictly limited 
period. However, a succession of deregulatory measures in 1997, 1998, 
and 2003 abolished these limitations. Temporary employment contracts 
such as those lasting only the length of a particular assignment were 
introduced. For these contracts there was the possibility of reemploying 
temps three months after a fi rst assignment, subject to the limitations of 
the common regulation of fi xed-term contracts.
In Norway temporary agency work is only allowed for unskilled 
offi ce or commercial work. Its regulation has established the principle 
of the permanent contract, but acknowledges exceptions for which em-
ployment contracts can be temporary. The number of these exceptions 
Ch. 9.indd   282 4/11/2008   11:45:17 AM
Temporary Agency Work in Europe   283
has risen since 1996. Today a temporary contract is more often used by 
TWA than a permanent one. 
The content of the contract of a temporary agency employee in Aus-
tria is prescribed by regulation. It is not required to be a temporary 
contract, but it must stipulate the level of pay, the duration of work as-
signment, the amount of notice required for job termination, the nature 
of the work, and the place of work. Thus, while no principle requiring 
temporary contracts applies, the content of the contract defi nes the work 
as temporary.
From the perspective of both the status of temporary employment 
agencies and the content of the employee’s contract, recent Dutch de-
velopments are atypical. The “Flexicurity” and “WAADI” Acts passed 
in January 1999 in the Netherlands abolished permits for temporary 
work agencies and determined that the temporary worker is progres-
sively bound as employment continues to the employment agency by a 
standard contract. This means that time thresholds determine in stages 
the increases in employee rights and wages. After 18 months at a single 
client fi rm or 36 months at various fi rms, the employment contract be-
comes a standard open-ended contract with the TWA. Storrie (2002) 
judges the new Dutch legislation as “rather innovative.” 
Defi ning Both TWAs and Temporary Employees
Finally, in France, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium, a clearly defi ned le-
gal status is given to the temporary employment agencies. In addition, a 
special status differentiates their temporary employees from other tem-
porary workers with ordinary fi xed-term contracts and their permanent 
employees such as the staff of the agencies. 
France has been one of the leaders in the development of TAW and 
its regulations since it was fi rst regulated in 1972. Consequently, infor-
mation on TAW is relatively plentiful when compared to many other 
countries. In France, the TWA is not an ordinary fi rm. Until the be-
ginning of 2005, the provision of temporary employees hired and paid 
by the TWA had to be the only profi t-making activity of the agency. 
However, a new regulation in 2005 allowed a TWA to perform as ordi-
nary employment agency in addition to its specifi c TWA business. The 
TWA also is subject to two special obligations. First, the company must 
fi le statements to document a specifi ed level of fi nancial resources and 
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regularly provide the government with a full account of its activities. 
Second, a temporary employee of this type of company has a unique 
legal contract known as an “assignment contract” with prescribed con-
tent, accompanied by a set of extensive rules protecting the employee.
Some other countries have chosen similar approaches. In Portugal, 
TWAs must be licensed. Employment contracts are subject to specifi c 
legislation that stipulates the regulations of the three-way relationship. 
In Italy, TAW was forbidden until 1997. A law passed in that year au-
thorized TAW for the fi rst time and established the conditions for its 
use. The specifi c character of temporary work agencies was acknowl-
edged. This legislation established a contract for temporary work that 
is drawn up between the TWA and the client company. In addition, 
special provisions were included that relate to the situation of tempo-
rary employees. 
The legislation in Belgium defi nes the various forms of temporary 
work but appears to formally avoid defi ning a status for temporary em-
ployment agencies. However, the content required in a TAW contract is 
specifi ed and known as “temporary for work on the premises of a third 
party.” However, TAW has been affected by the general trends in Bel-
gium toward regulating all nonstandard forms of employment. These 
efforts toward formal regulations include extending the required length 
of an employment assignment; less monitoring of employers to verify 
that they are observing the required length of employment, particularly 
by union representatives; and improving social security coverage and 
ongoing training for temporary agency employees.8
This section has discussed how regulations have been used to clarify 
the three-way relationship specifi c to TAW. Even those countries pursu-
ing labor market deregulation to extend the use of more fl exible types 
of employment have developed regulations to provide a clearer legal 
framework and better social protection for temporary workers. Thus, 
nontraditional forms of employment may be regulated with the ultimate 
goal of deregulating more traditional forms of employment. But the 
result is the creation of a paradoxical situation: far from deregulated 
fl exibility, more regulation is being introduced to increase the fl exibility 
of the labor markets. 
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EMPLOYER AND UNION ORGANIZATIONS AND 
STRATEGIES TOWARD TAW
As discussed above, the temporary agency business in many Eu-
ropean countries is a relatively new and poorly regulated institution. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the relationships between TWA 
employer organizations and unions also remain relatively underdevel-
oped, and that collective bargaining in this sector is still evolving.9 
In most EU countries TWAs are organized to varying degrees to 
create their own national employer organizations. Today in France, 
Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal, there is one national employer or-
ganization. A single organization in France was created when two ear-
lier organizations merged in 1998. In Spain and the Netherlands there 
are two employer groups. Employers are not organized in a separate 
association in only a few countries, such as in Sweden. 
In contrast to employers’ organizations, the organization of tem-
porary agency workers in specialized unions is rare, as reported in the 
1999 EIRO survey. The report on Italy is the only one that indicates that 
unions are exploring concerns related to separate unions for temporary 
workers. However, although union attitudes toward TAW are generally 
changing as the importance of labor market fl exibility is acknowledged, 
unions remain largely hostile to TAW. It is this hostility that explains 
why unions favor bargaining with the client fi rm rather than the TWA, 
despite the fact that regulations identify the employer for the purposes 
of collective bargaining as the TWA instead of the client fi rm. 
As a result of the relative lack of employer and employee organi-
zations, the organization of industrial relations in the TAW businesses 
remains relatively weak. A number of TWAs are not covered by the 
agreement between sectoral organizations of the social partners. These 
TWAs conclude work agreements with their own work councils. Ger-
many is one notable exception, however. An employer organization 
for the TWA businesses, the Unternehmensverband für Zeitarbeit e.V 
(UZA), was founded in 1969. The fi rst collective bargaining agreement 
for TAW was signed in 1970.
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Employer and Union Attitudes toward TAW
The relations between TAW employers and unions are fraught with 
tensions and confl icts that arise from the relatively recent growth in most 
countries of temporary agency work. All employers who are potential 
users of TAW understand the benefi ts of temporary employment. They 
now advocate fl exibility in employment arrangements and appreciate 
the options provided by TAW for adjusting their labor force with fewer 
restricting regulations. In contrast, unions in all of the EU countries per-
ceive the negative impact of TAW since it threatens the employment-
related rights of the permanent employees. Temporary agency workers 
are paid less than the permanent workers, do not have equivalent social 
protection, and continue to be subject to employer “abuses.” It is easier 
for employers to hire and fi re temporary agency workers than perma-
nent employees, to hire temporary workers to replace strikers, and to 
fi re temporary workers for minor causes without an appeal process. 
However, the strategic objectives of employers and unions are not 
always antagonistic. Since TAW in Europe is often considered by work-
ers as the worst type of fl exible employment arrangement, employers in 
some countries have declared their willingness to limit abuses related to 
TAW and tried to improve the image of this work. For example, Man-
power France declared its willingness to limit TAW abuses, which led 
to negotiations with unions before the fi rst TWA regulation in France 
in 1972. Also, the public relations activities of French temporary work 
agencies seek to convince workers that TAW can be highly skilled and 
better paid employment, which can introduce a worker to a real career 
for life. They try to convince potential client fi rms that they can provide 
to them highly skilled and better selected people at a lower cost. Span-
ish employers also agreed to limit abuses, although they disagree with 
the unions over what should be done. Swedish employers complain 
about the poor quality of temporary agency workers. They consider 
better training a more pressing need than any change in the regulations. 
German employers also have focused on fi nding ways to improve the 
relatively negative image of TAW. 
However, some progress has been made, as unions generally are no 
longer overtly hostile to TAW. This refl ects either a strategic fallback 
position in the face of a fait accompli, or the recognition that it is better 
to work toward the improvement of social protections that fi t the spe-
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cial situation of TAWs. In some countries the unions now acknowledge 
the valid role of TAW. However, they retain the objective of providing 
a framework for this type of work, even if it is only to ensure that the 
uses of TAW remain within established limits. This is the case in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy.
Strategies for Compromise
The process of identifying common ground between employers and 
unions is not easy. However, appropriate strategies can create the condi-
tions for compromise through collective bargaining between temporary 
employment agencies and unions, or client companies and unions. 
France and Belgium are countries where some common ground has 
been found. French employers in the temporary agency industry called 
for standards to be adopted for TAW. Although historically the unions 
have long demanded a ban on TAW, they participated in the discussions. 
The 1990 cross-sector collective bargaining agreement, extended in the 
form of a law in the same year and still in effect today, deals with most 
aspects of the relationship between the temporary agency employer and 
its employees. A number of agreements in the client industry sectors 
relating to areas such as vocational training, safety and hygiene, and 
union rights have complemented this agreement. In Belgium, employ-
ers have declared themselves in favor of controlled growth for TAW. 
The unions within several client companies demanded long and renew-
able periods of temporary agency employment. However, they signed 
an agreement in 1997 supporting the principle that TAW is the best 
means for employment fl exibility. This represents a major change in the 
attitude of the unions toward TAW.
In Italy, a cross-sector collective bargaining agreement quickly fol-
lowed the enactment of the 1997 law authorizing TAW, even though 
differences of opinion between employers and unions delayed the pas-
sage of this law. The agreement seems to have been based on the notion 
that regulation by collective bargaining agreement is the only way to 
avoid infl exible labor markets, and that legislators should not be writing 
these regulations.
Even in the United Kingdom, the idea has begun to take root that 
some action must be taken due to the increasingly widespread use of 
the services of temporary work agencies. The concern is that the lack of 
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regulation may create confl ict between the dual functions of TWAs of 
selecting and hiring permanent workers for their clients, and providing 
their own workers for temporary use by the client. This turnabout in the 
United Kingdom attitude is particularly interesting since it is the most 
hostile country in Europe to any employment regulation other than the 
protections against discrimination. However, no major reform has been 
undertaken yet.
In addition to negotiations between temporary agency employers 
and unions, collective bargaining in client companies also can focus 
on TAW at either the fi rm level or the cross-industry level. In Austria, 
France, Italy, and the Netherlands, negotiations have become more 
prevalent in both the client company sectors and temporary employ-
ment industry, and in Italy and France, even at the cross-sector level. In 
a few countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and 
Luxembourg, negotiations take place almost exclusively, and sometimes 
totally, at the level of the temporary employment agency industry. Or-
ganization in Belgium is exemplary. Since 1987 there has been a jointly 
run employers and unions committee in the temporary employment in-
dustry, which is similar to the organizations used for other industries in 
Belgium. In Finland and Sweden, however, there is no negotiation at 
the temporary agency industry level; negotiations occur only at client 
company level.
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: LAW AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Temporary agency work is a form of employment that has appeared 
in Europe because it initially provided employers with a way to avoid 
the constraining regulations governing standard employment. Legis-
lated and negotiated regulations on TAW were developed in response 
to limit the maneuvers of employers to cases in which exceptions to 
the standard of employment can be justifi ed. As employer ingenuity 
found ways to increase the margin for maneuvering despite, or in paral-
lel with, the law or collective agreements with which they are supposed 
to comply, regulations have been updated in an effort to reduce the mar-
gin for maneuvering, reduce the scope of abuses, and impose standards. 
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Temporary agency work and its regulation have continued to evolve 
over the past 10 to 15 years, but are not reproducing the traditional in-
dustrial relations models previously used in Europe. 
A typology of three regulatory frameworks is commonly used in 
Europe. The fi rst model is the Latin countries (the South), where the 
state imposes a large number of regulations which are not always prop-
erly obeyed. The second is the German-Scandinavian model (the conti-
nental North), in which regulation has historically imposed obligatory 
minimum standards. Finally there is the British model, largely infl u-
enced by the dominant free market theories of the 1980s and 1990s. In 
this model there is an almost total absence of regulation for TAW. 
The following analysis of the national reports from the EIRO centers 
illustrates the limitations of these traditional industrial relations models 
when applied to the case of TAW because new employment trends are 
reducing the differences between the three models and thereby the rel-
evance of such a typology. Negotiation no longer augments the legally 
enforced standards as was the usual historical function of collective 
bargaining in many countries. Instead, negotiation may, under some 
conditions, remove or challenge the advantages granted to employees 
under the law. The interesting question is what the regulatory model of 
the future will be.
The Latin Model
According to the Latin model, the state imposes many regulations, 
but they are not always followed properly. However, there have been 
no regulations for TAW for a long time, and the need for a framework 
has surfaced only in the last few years. This change occurred in a period 
when the Latin model had already been altered to some extent through 
negotiated regulation achieved through collective bargaining. Although 
almost unknown in the past, negotiated regulation has become to vary-
ing degrees an accepted practice in recent years. Italy and Spain are 
examples of this model, while Greece and Portugal are exceptions. The 
early and protective regulation of TAW in France is unique. 
Italy is an excellent example of the change operating within the 
Latin Model. According to the 1999 EIRO survey, the late recognition 
of TAW in this country in 1997 is attributable to the deep-seated differ-
ences in the positions taken by employers and unions toward TAW. Two 
Ch. 9.indd   289 4/11/2008   11:45:19 AM
290   Michon
collective bargaining agreements (one national across industries and the 
other national for the TWA business sector) were signed in 1998 imme-
diately after this recognition. Compared to the provisions of the 1997 
law, the negotiated agreements were more restrictive on certain points, 
such as the introduction of a maximum length for TAW assignments. 
However, the agreements were more fl exible on other points, such as 
identifying new situations in which TAW can be used by a company and 
stipulating the rights of temporary employees. Thus, negotiation rapidly 
imposed its mark.
Spain has followed a pattern similar to that of Italy. Temporary 
agency work has been recognized in Spain by law since 1994 (with 
amendments in 1995 and 1997). Some unions refused any recognition 
of TAW. Others tried to limit the use of TAW to the strictly temporary 
needs of client companies or to give some special permanent contracts 
to temporary workers, and to provide better protections to workers. Em-
ployers recognized that abuses occurred. Finally, the collective bargain-
ing agreements of 1997 and 1998 attempted to improve the regulation 
of TAW. These agreements were negotiated cross-sector and within the 
TWA sector, including one known as the state agreement, which was 
later changed into a law. The 1999 EIRO survey stressed that TAW 
remains a central theme of collective bargaining negotiations in Spain, 
but it is the subject of incessant dispute between employers and unions 
about the desired model of TAW.
Greece and Portugal are the exceptions to the Latin model. In 
Greece, as already noted, there is still no offi cial acknowledgment of 
TAW either in legislation or negotiated agreements. The 1999 EIRO 
survey stressed that in Portugal TAW is regulated by a 1989 law. This 
legislation supersedes a collective bargaining agreement that has never 
been enforced. However, union participation is occurring now as part 
of the general public debate over the changes that should be made to 
the 1989 law.
France is a special case within the group of Latin countries due to 
its early and very protective regulation of TAW. Moreover, contrary 
to the reputation of the French government that regulates everything, 
regulations negotiated through collective bargaining have been part and 
parcel of the French legislative decisions for many years. Although the 
regulation of TAW in France is principally carried out by enacting leg-
islation, on several occasions the law has only reviewed and modifi ed 
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a number of the issues previously negotiated by employers and unions. 
For example, the fi rst French law on TAW in 1972 was based largely on 
the previous provisions adopted by Manpower France. Again, in 1990, 
the government used the option known as “extension” in the French 
industrial relations system to confer legal status on the provisions of the 
cross-sector collective bargaining agreement for the temporary work 
business.
The German-Scandinavian Model
The principles of the German-Scandinavian model include mini-
mum standards imposed by legislation with almost all additional regu-
lations imposed by collective bargaining. This model is not any better 
suited to the fi eld of TAW than the Latin model. Although Austria is 
still a good example of this model as applied to TAW, it does not fi t the 
other countries well (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Germany) due to one of two considerations. In some countries the law 
prescribes some limits and/or principles that signifi cantly restrict the 
opportunities for collective bargaining negotiations on TAW. In other 
countries the current trend toward deregulation and increased fl exibility 
in employment are changing profoundly the fundamental characteris-
tics of the relationship between legislation and negotiation to the detri-
ment of the former. 
Austrian law carefully frames the work of temporary employment 
agencies. These agencies must have permits to operate and observe the 
obligatory content of the contract binding the TWA and the employee. 
A TWA sector-level collective bargaining agreement complements the 
law on pay issues. Moreover, the collective agreements of many client 
companies deal specifi cally with the issue of TAW. The primary con-
cern is the requirement that temporary work agency employees must be 
recruited on permanent contracts. 
In contrast, TAW in Norway is an excellent illustration of how the 
legal framework signifi cantly restricts the opportunities for collective 
bargaining negotiations on TAW, thereby deviating from the German-
Scandinavian model. The 1999 EIRO survey emphasizes that a wide 
margin has developed in Norway between the laws which establish le-
gal principles and bans on activities so that TAW is strictly regulated, 
relative to the actual practices of the client fi rms. Probably for this rea-
Ch. 9.indd   291 4/11/2008   11:45:19 AM
292   Michon
son, TAW is as widespread in Norway as in many other EU countries, 
and now accounts for 2 percent of the labor force. The EIRO survey 
observes that collective bargaining seems to have neglected TAW since 
this sector is not yet covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
However, TAW does not seem to be the subject of any signifi cant dis-
pute. With no information available on disputes, the report can only 
theorize that issues related to TAW are discussed in the in-house nego-
tiations with the client companies.
The case of TAW in Denmark illustrates a change in the relation-
ship between legislation and negotiation. Prior to 1990, the regulation 
of TAW was carried out by legislation. The law only allowed TAW in 
a few industries (retail and offi ce work) and only licensed temporary 
employment agencies were allowed to handle it. In 1990 both sets of 
restrictions were lifted. Subsequently collective bargaining has grown 
rapidly in the newly opened industries. 
Curiously, the regulation of TAW in Germany appears to be a bad 
example of the German-Scandinavian model. Regulations in this coun-
try have undergone a rather stormy passage. The fi rst and only col-
lective bargaining agreement ever reached on TAW dates back to the 
1970s. The principle of a permanent contract binding a temporary em-
ployee to the TWA was laid out in the fi rst piece of legislation in 1972. 
In 1989 the collective bargaining agreement was not renewed. In 1997 
statutory constraints were greatly relaxed. At present temporary em-
ployees still are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and 
remain outside the participation system which regulates all the German 
industrial relations.10 
In the Netherlands the model of a complementary relationship be-
tween laws and negotiation is apparent. A law passed in January 1999 
altered the legal framework by removing any specifi c defi nition of 
TAW, requirements to license temporary employment agencies, and 
the need to acknowledge the temporary nature of the employment con-
tract. However, TAW has been the focus of a high degree of negotiation 
between temporary work agencies and unions, client companies and 
unions, and employers’ associations of temporary work agencies and 
associations acting on behalf of client companies.
A similar scenario to that of the Netherlands occurred in 1991 in 
Sweden, when the sector called “workforce rent” was deregulated. 
Since the deregulation collective bargaining in Sweden has devoted 
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more attention to TAW. For example, the local union must approve the 
hiring of any temporary staff, including temporary agency workers. The 
union also must participate in a discussion of pay between two assign-
ments for temporary agency workers. However, this is not as radical as 
in the contemporary Netherlands. Despite deregulation the Swedish law 
still guarantees temporary agency workers some minimal protection. 
Examples include the possibility of being hired on a permanent contract 
by the client company, and prohibiting a client fi rm from asking its em-
ployees whose fi xed-term contracts have just expired to return to work 
as temporary employment agency workers. The current debate primar-
ily is focused on the possible introduction of a system of licensing by an 
independent authority for temporary employment agencies. 
The British Model
The British model is still in effect in the United Kingdom, even 
though the current administration is said to be thinking of regulating 
the employment contract by binding the employee and the “employ-
ment agency.” Since there are only a few regulations of employment 
relationships in the United Kingdom, and above all of TAW, fi rms do 
not have to use any innovative practices to avoid the prescriptions of 
the legislator. 
RULES GOVERNING THE USE OF TAW AND THE 
PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES
The discussion in the previous section focuses on the differences in 
the policy approaches used to control the use of TAW. They typically 
involve the joint use of legislation and collective bargaining agreements 
in various combinations determined by the national industrial relations 
systems of each EU country. In this section the discussion is focused on 
the key aspects of TAW that legislation or bargaining seek to regulate.
In addition to the rules that control the business of TWAs such 
as the requirement to have a permit to operate, the regulations con-
trol the use of TAW by client fi rms and provide some social protection 
to the temporary employee. There are four main types of regulations: 
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those that 1) control the length of TAW contract; 2) defi ne the employ-
ment situations in which user fi rms can ask for workers from agencies; 
3) require parity in the conditions of employment and pay between tem-
porary agency workers and permanent workers doing the same work 
in a client company; and 4) grant union and representation rights to 
temporary agency workers in the client company and/or in the tempo-
rary employment agency, and regulate union and representation rights 
to ordinary employees and union representatives in the client company 
when temporary agency workers are present.
Table 9.3 presents a brief overview of the key regulated aspects of 
TAW. It can be observed that a deep gulf divides the countries that have 
deregulated TAW to varying degrees (in some cases, almost complete-
ly as in the United Kingdom) and those that are maintaining or even 
strengthening the legislative or negotiated framework. 
Permitted Use of TAW, Contract Length, and Parity
Many European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Portugal, and Spain) always control TAW in the fi rst three key 
aspects simultaneously. Therefore, regulations determine the maximum 
length of assignment for which a worker is hired, the circumstances 
in which temporary agency workers can be used, and the principle of 
parity in conditions of work and pay between TAW and permanent em-
ployees. 
As discussed above, when TAW was legally introduced in Italy, it 
was with strict control of TWA businesses. The Italian law did not set 
any limitation on the length of assignments. However, two 1998 collec-
tive bargaining agreements limited both the use of TAW and the length 
of contracts. One contract that covered the TWA businesses determined 
that TAW could be used only in case of an absence of an employee, to 
provide skills that are not present within the client fi rm, or for any other 
reason negotiated through collective bargaining. The other contract was 
the April 1998 national multi-industry agreement. It identifi ed which 
reasons are acceptable to use temporary agency workers: to provide 
coverage in periods of additional workload, skills not present on the la-
bor market, and employees who could perform specifi c tasks that could 
not be performed by an employee of the fi rm. Contract length, includ-
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ing four renewals, was limited to 24 months. Other regulations required 
parity with permanent employees.
Since TAW was fi rst regulated in 1972, in France the regulations 
have been relaxed or strengthened in response to the interest of the po-
litical majority and new choices of collective bargaining. For example, 
a 1990 change reintroduced a list of authorized uses for temporary 
agency workers which had been suppressed a few years earlier. The 
list limited the use to the replacement of an absent employee, the re-
placement of a departing employee when the job must be fi lled only 
temporarily, fi lling a position until a new permanent employee arrives, 
handling a temporary additional workload, and completing tasks de-
fi ned as temporary “by nature.” Temporary agency workers thus cannot 
be used to do the standard work of the fi rm, to fi ll core permanent jobs, 
or to replace strikers. The standard length of assignments is limited to 
18 months, including renewals. The length of the contract must be in-
dicated in a written contract between the employee and the employer. 
In some very specifi c situations, such as those that arise when the end 
of the work assignment cannot be determined at the time the contract is 
written, the contract can be left open-ended. However, in these cases, 
the written contract must indicate a minimum length for the assignment. 
Parity with permanent workers is formally required. In this context, 
the recent 2005 change is often considered a “revolution.” Some new 
uses are authorized, which are not defi ned in terms of user fi rm needs, 
but in terms of worker profi le: to contribute to employment policies, it 
is authorized to use temporary agency work for people with very low 
employability.
If controls are present generally in all the three areas simultane-
ously, there are countries where they may be very strict in some area or 
concerning some specifi c situation and weak in another. For example, in 
Belgium the maximum period of time for which temporary agency staff 
can be employed varies greatly. Temporary agency work contracts are 
limited to 15 days if the employee is covering for a permanent member 
of staff, or 12 months with possible extension for a further six months if 
there is an increase in company workload. Compared to Belgium, Italy 
with its maximum of a 24-month period and four renewals (see above) 
is the complete opposite.
For continental Europeans, it is not surprising to observe that the 
United Kingdom has no regulations stipulating a maximum length of 
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Table 9.3  Regulation of Key Aspects of Temporary Agency Work
Country
Regulation of maximum 
length of TAW contract







Austria None Very few Yes No special provisions




Signifi cant (replacement 
of employee, temporary 
increase in workload and 
special work)
Yes Mainly in agency
Denmark None None No (only by CB in 
some sectors)
No special provisions
Finland None None No No special provisions
France Usually 18 months 
(including renewal), 
but 9 of 24 months in 
some circumstances
Signifi cant (replacement 
of employees, temporary 
increase in workload and 
inherently temporary work), 
specifi c workforce groups 
(very low employability)
Yes Mainly in agency
Germany None Very few Introduced in the 
2003 legislation, 
can be suppressed 
by CB
Divided but mainly in 
agency
Greece None None No No special provisions
Ireland None None No No special provisions
C
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Italy 24 months (including 4 
renewals) by CB
Signifi cant (replacement, 
special skills, or—by CB—
for workload peaks, specifi c 
tasks/skills)
Yes Divided but mainly in 
agency
Luxembourg 12 months, including 2 
renewals
Signifi cant (specifi c, non- 
permanent jobs, not part of 
enterprise’s normal activity)
Yes Divided but mainly in 
agency
Netherlands None Very few Yes No special provisions
Norway None Signifi cant (replacement, 





Portugal 6–12 months Signifi cant (replacement, 
temporary increases in 
workload, and short-lived 
seasonal tasks)
Yes In agency (user 
company after 2 years)
Spain No maximum in some 
cases, 6 months in 
others (up to 18 months 
by CB) 
As for other temporary 
work (replacement, 
specifi c work, market 
circumstances, temporary 
increases in workload)
Yes Mainly in the user 
company
Sweden None None No In agency
UK None Very few No No special provisions
NOTE: CB = collective bargaining
SOURCE: 1999 EIRO Survey (reproduced from EIRO [2000]). 
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contract, rules on parity, nor constraints restricting the activities of “em-
ployment agencies” to specifi c employment situations in which they 
can be used. Existing regulations only impose the principles of racial 
and sexual equality, and equal opportunities for the disabled and union 
members, for every type of employment contract. 
It is more surprising to observe the same absence of regulations in 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and the same exception for parity. In Den-
mark, for example, collective bargaining agreements in industries using 
agency workers include rules on wage parity. In Sweden, wage parity is 
not one of the basic principles enshrined in law, but temporary agency 
workers have the right to the same safety and hygiene conditions as 
permanent staff.
Two countries have recently relaxed their regulations: Germany and 
the Netherlands. Prior to 1997, Germany required open-ended contracts 
between an agency and temporary agency workers, and restricted TAW 
to a list of formally defi ned uses. In 1997 fi xed-term contracts were 
introduced. These contracts must have exactly the same length as the 
assignment in the client fi rm, and maximum length of the assignment 
was increased from 9 to 12 months. Furthermore, the use restrictions 
were eliminated.
The Netherlands abolished maximum length limits on contracts in 
1999. At the same time the employment contract for TAW was trans-
formed into an open-ended contract after an employee worked for 26 
weeks for the same client company. Also, the regulation determining 
the content of every standard employment contract, whether fi xed-term 
or open-ended, was changed. The dismissal procedure for the open-
ended contracts was relaxed. Furthermore, the existing regulations on 
parity were maintained. 
It is diffi cult to evaluate these changes in Germany and the Nether-
lands. It is not clear whether they represent deregulation or a change in 
the regulation of TAW (see Storrie 2002, p. 17).
Unions’ Effects on Key Aspects of TAW
The regulation of TAW within a country depends on the politi-
cal and social power relations and the features of the national labor 
markets. Predicting the union and representation rights for temporary 
agency workers within a country is diffi cult due to several consider-
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ations. First, weak, nonexplicit, and poorly formalized regulation of the 
conditions of TWA does not mean that unions are without any power 
against possible abuses by employers. It can be the opposite: union 
control balances the weakness of formal regulations. In Sweden, for 
example, where the constraints on the use of temporary agency workers 
are minimal, the request for temporary agency workers must be ap-
proved by employee representatives in the client company. Belgium, 
which otherwise imposes much more constraint, is the only other coun-
try where the agreement of employee representatives is required. In a 
small number of other countries, such as Germany, Italy, Norway, and 
Portugal, union agreement is not required, but employee representa-
tives must be informed. In the other countries, whatever the regulations 
of the use of TAW—whether very detailed and strict, minimal, or no 
control—employers have no obligation to inform unions or employee 
representatives of the use of temporary agency workers.
Second, powerful unions and strictly controlled TAW do not neces-
sary imply either specifi c unionization or representation rights equiva-
lent to those of every ordinary employee. Union rights of temporary 
agency workers are not always recognized. And where they are rec-
ognized, this may be within the temporary employment agency, as in 
France, Luxembourg, and Norway, or within the client company, as in 
Sweden and Italy. In Germany, temporary agency workers cannot vote 
or stand for election to representative authorities, but may take part in 
meetings and consult employee representatives in their company. In 
Italy, the right to engage in union activity does not prevent temporary 
agency workers from being excluded from calculations to work out the 
number of seats granted to employee representatives within the user 
fi rm or the appropriate unit of the user fi rm.
Finally, there is little correlation between the existence of regula-
tions on the maximum length of employment, the circumstances of 
the valid use of temporary agency staff, and the principles of parity on 
the one hand, and the recognition of temporary agency workers’ union 
rights and the role played by the employees’ representatives on the oth-
er. It can be hypothesized that the more powerful unions are, and/or the 
tighter the labor market conditions, the more regulation of temporary 
agency work can be expected. However, this hypothesis has not been 
empirically tested. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter has provided an overview of the development of TAW 
in the EU. However, it also has shown how large the differences in 
TAW are between the EU members and how diffi cult it is to make com-
parisons within the EU. Additional comparative research therefore will 
help us to better understand TAW and its contributions to improving 
labor market fl exibility. 
The history of temporary work agencies is highly variable within 
EU: some are relatively old businesses as in France, while others are 
very recent businesses as in Italy where TAW was authorized only a few 
years ago. In some countries TAW is highly regulated and strictly con-
trolled by national legislation and collective bargaining, while in others, 
such as the United Kingdom, it is relatively unregulated. Even if the 
present dynamics suggest some convergence to more deregulated TAW, 
no really common defi nitions of TAW are used throughout the EU. 
The widely varying status and regulation of TAW in the EU member 
states are closely linked to and dependent on those of standard employ-
ment relationships, which remain as different from one EU member to 
the other as those of the TAW relationships. Due to these signifi cant 
cross-national differences, it is not surprising that any solid agreement 
at the EU level about TAW issues, even the principle of parity between 
temporary agency workers and permanent employees, remains illu-
sive.
Today European labor markets are trapped between two contradic-
tory dynamics. One set of increased pressures is working for a deregu-
lated labor market at EU member states level. This is being countered 
by the increased necessity to provide some regulation at the EU level 
to avoid social dumping from unregulated countries, especially the new 
EU members from Eastern Europe.
Only one trend has emerged that allows us to predict the directions 
in which TAW will evolve in the future: new employment relationships 
are being tested by EU members as ways of making European labor 
markets more fl exible and adaptable to the changing economic forces 
of the global economy. Temporary agency work is one of these new 
relationships; it presently represents something like a social laboratory 
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in Europe. It can be expected to be an important issue at the heart of 
collective bargaining in Europe in the foreseeable future.
Several topics will provide useful insights to guide future develop-
ments in EU-level employment and industrial relations policies. First, 
in-depth national case studies will provide useful insights into the for-
ces resulting in changes in labor market institutions. The cases should 
discuss the recent trends in the development of temporary agency work 
and the contribution of TAW to greater labor market fl exibility. Second, 
more information is needed about the best way to regulate TAW. Con-
ducting and comparing in-depth case studies in countries with different 
approaches to TAW will provide useful insights into the optimal poli-
cies for national regulation. Third, because at present only part-time and 
fi xed-term contracts are measured by European surveys, while TAW is 
not, case studies will provide the knowledge needed to design statisti-
cal surveys to collect better comparative data on TWA and the other 
nonstandard employment arrangements that provide employers with 
options for better numerical fl exibility. Fourth, national comparative 
case studies of the strategies of employers’ organizations and unions 
will provide better information on issues related to the future of TAW. 
Specifi cally, it is necessary to understand why the national employer 
organizations did not succeed in harmonizing their positions at the Eu-
ropean level and the implications for future harmonization efforts. 
Finally, at present TAW remains primarily low-skilled jobs. How-
ever, two changes have been observed that may affect the future direc-
tions of the development of TAW. First, it has been observed in many 
countries that temporary work agencies are beginning to prospect labor 
markets with better qualifi ed workers, but we do not know whether this 
is a new strategy in all European countries. Second, TAW is primar-
ily present in the industrial sector in some European countries and in 
the service sector in other countries. It is not clear whether there is 
any convergence occurring between the European countries that will 
reduce these differentiations between European countries or whether 
such changes should be anticipated. Comparative case studies and com-
parative statistical surveys can be used to answer these questions.
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Notes
 1. The defi ning characteristic of TAW is the three-way relationship between the em-
ployee (the temporary agency worker), the company called the “temporary work 
agency” (the employer in most of the national legislation), and the client fi rm 
(the user of the employees of the temporary work agency). See Gonos (1997, p. 
105) for further discussion of this relationship. 
 2. From 1990 through 2004, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rates in the 
EU-15 (the members prior to May 1, 2004, when new members were accepted) 
ranged from a low of 7.4 percent in 2001 to high of 10.5 percent in 1994. During 
the same period in the United States, the unemployment rate ranged from a low 
of 4.0 percent in 2000 to a high of 7.5 percent in 1992 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2005a,b).
 3. The Statistical Offi ce of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) is the offi cial 
institute for processing and publishing comparable data at the EU level. The 
statistical agencies of the EU member countries collect the data, but EUROSTAT 
works with them to defi ne common data collection methods. EUROSTAT then 
consolidates the data and adjusts the data as needed so that they are compa-
rable. 
 4. National estimates that are not based on a standardized defi nition of TAW cannot 
be used for any serious international comparison.
 5. A summary of the study is available at the following Web site: http://www
.eurofound.eu.int/working/tempagency_new.htm, updated December 2002. The 
summary presents the main fi ndings and conclusions from Storrie (2002). The 
report is based on 15 national reports commissioned by the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
 6. Specifi cally, an industrial relations system for the EU is only beginning to 
emerge, and is in the very early stages of development. Many diffi culties arise 
due to the fact that the national industrial relations systems are organized very 
differently, with varying rules for unions and different levels and competencies 
in collective bargaining.
   The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) 
on one side and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) on the other 
are the main representatives of the national organizations and confederations 
for Europe-wide collective negotiations. Note that only confederations rather 
than the unions or associations themselves are represented in this organization of 
EU-level collective bargaining. Also, all of the national confederations of trade 
unions are not represented in ETUC. For example, one of the largest unions in 
France, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), was not a member of 
ETUC until a few years ago. Furthermore, newly created national unions and 
confederations rarely are represented.
 7. The one notable exception to these three categories is Greece. In this country 
even regular work is not formally defi ned, so there is almost no information 
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about the different forms of employment. However, TAW is known to exist in 
Greece.
 8. In Europe, depending on the country, social security refers to benefi ts such as 
illness coverage and pension contributions as well as employment security and 
unemployment benefi ts.
 9. There are three possible levels for collective bargaining on TWA: 1) the level of 
the actual TWA business when it exists in a specifi c sector depending on the rules 
of each country, 2) the level of client fi rms (each client sector or level of users of 
any sector), and 3) the cross-industry level including the TWA business and the 
client business. 
 10. The German participation system allows unions to be part of the decision system 
of the fi rm.
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